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2 
"AWAKENING THE CONSCIENCE 
OF THE MASSES" 
The Vietnamese Confederation of 
Labour, 1947-75 
Edmund Wehrle 
In 1948, Gilbert Jouan, a French colonial customs officer with twenty 
years' experience in Indochina and an abiding faith that trade unions 
would form a bulwark against Communist intrusion, took the first tentative 
steps toward organizing Vietnamese workers. Working with the French 
Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), Jouan and other Catholic 
trade unionists in 1947 formed a "delegation" representing CFTC interests 
in Vietnam, and notified French authorities of his intention to organize 
"an authentic Christian trade union in Indochina . . . for the Indochinese 
themselves". 1 
Strictly speaking, Jouan's actions violated the law. Trade unions, 
explained one colonial official in 1948, had "absolutely no legal standing; 
groups such as these are merely tolerated by public officials".2 Still, the 
French invested great hope in Jouan's work. An official report on Christian 
trade union organizing described Jouan as "worthy of our esteem". The 
13 
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colonial government even arranged time off from the customs office 
for Jouan so that he could focus on the organizing work that officials 
obviously hoped would counterbalance the appeal of the Viet Minh.3 
"The consolidation of the support of the working class in Vietnam is 
mainly to be achieved by close collaboration with the Christian Trade 
Union", explained the Vietnamese Minister of Social Action.4 The result 
was an awkward modus vivendi between the nascent, still-illegal labour 
organization and the colonial state. 
Within a few years, Jouan's Christian labour movement grew in 
numbers and clout, and eventually took the name the Confederation 
Vietnamienne du Travail Chretien (Vietnamese Confederation of Christian 
Workers, known best by its French acronym, CVTC). The organization 
had far-reaching ambitions - to be an activist and independent voice 
for the oppressed workers of Vietnam. Its survival for the next two-
and-a-half decades remains a testament to the skill and commitment of 
its leadership and rank-and-file. Likewise, frequent strikes, workplace 
actions, and political activism sponsored by the confederation suggest a 
genuine militancy on the part of South Vietnam's unions and workers. 
Yet true autonomy and independence of action in South Vietnam proved 
virtually impossible to maintain. In order to survive, the CVTC entered 
into compromising alliances with the French (described above) and a 
succession of problematic Saigon governments. This awkward balancing 
act between serving the interests of the state and acting aggressively on 
behalf of workers plagued the CVTC throughout its existence - and 
in some ways represents the central paradox facing today's labour 
movement in Vietnam. In the case of the CVTC, this limitation proved 
an insurmountable handicap. 
This chapter discusses at length the CVTC's ill-fated struggle to 
preserve its autonomy. It explores the history of the organization from its 
inception (depicted in the opening vignette) to its end in 1975 as Saigon 
fell to the North Vietnamese. Understandably, an organization dedicated 
to mobilizing workers and remaking society faced an uphill struggle 
during the colonial era. Obstacles impeding the CVTC, however, further 
increased under the repressive Diem regime, which sought to harness South 
Vietnamese labour for its own political purposes. Ngo Dinh Diem's death 
and the U.S. intervention portended better days. The CVT (Vietnamese 
Confederation of Labour; the term "Christian" was later dropped from the 
Western translation) made great advances in the mid-1960s, organizing 
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throngs of workers and negotiating beneficial contracts, especially with 
U.S. employers. However, while it sought to avoid conflict with Saigon 
government officials, labour-state tensions simmered. Seeking tighter control 
as war ravaged the country, state officials grew increasingly suspicious 
of a movement with its own agenda of empowering the lower classes. 
Rumours swirled constantly that the National Liberation Front (NLF or 
Viet Cong) had infiltrated the labour organization. These tensions came to 
a head in 1968, when the government moved to break a strike initiated 
by CVT militants. 
Despite the devastating strike and the equally challenging Tet Offensive 
of 1968, the CVT managed to recover. It remained an active force, entering 
politics in the late 1960s and contributing to major legislative reforms, 
including the 1971 Land-to-the-Tiller Act. Still, caution - a reluctance 
to push its government and its American allies too far - continued to 
characterize the organization to its demise in 1975. 
For the most part, scholars have overlooked the struggles of the CVT 
- despite its impressive membership numbers and political successes. 5 
This is partly due to a lack of sources. With most CVT records apparently 
destroyed in 1975, researchers are forced to tease out information from 
available sources, including a 1969 official history of the CVT, U.S. and 
French government documentation, and oral interviews with surviving 
members. The contested and politicized atmosphere surrounding the 
Vietnam War also presents challenges to telling the full story of an 
organization caught between historical currents. Indeed, despite a paucity 
of evidence, several scholars have dismissed the CVT as a pawn of 
the brutal Saigon government and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). As immediate memories of the divisive war fade, one hopes 
that balanced treatments, neither vilifying nor sanctifying the CVT, will 
emerge - providing the integrated treatment this fascinating movement 
deserves. 
THE LABOUR QUESTION IN VIETNAM 
While the tortuous history of organized labour in South Vietnam - the 
focus of this chapter - began in the waning days of French colonialism, 
the "labour question" in Vietnam had deep roots. From the earliest days of 
French rule, rapacious labour practices in Indochina, especially conditions 
on rubber plantations, where workers toiled often as little more than slaves, 
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drew international rebukes and violent resistance from Vietnamese workers. 
The worldwide economic crisis of the 1930s - felt deeply in Vietnam 
- lent new urgency to the issue. Reformers and radicals alike focused 
on organizing workers as a defence against the ravages of capitalism 
and colonialism. Throughout the decade, strikes at rubber plantations, 
smaller industries, and Saigon's docks presented a constant challenge to 
the French, who often launched brutal counteroffensives. 
As tensions smouldered, the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of 
colonialism, rooted in a blistering critique of labour exploitation, gained 
a growing following. In 1929, activists founded the Red Federation of 
General Unions and in 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party.6 While 
earlier nationalist campaigns focused on the small, educated elite of 
Vietnam, Communists targeted the country's proletariat (numbering roughly 
200,000, including small factory employees, shipyard workers, and coal 
miners) and the large masses of the peasants in their recruitment drive. 7 
By the late 1930s, French authorities began to shift tactics somewhat. In 
1936, a reform-minded "Popular Front" government under Prime Minister 
Leon Blum came to power in Paris. Blum introduced a broad program of 
reform legislation granting new rights to colonial workers. Labour unions, 
however, remained illegal. 8 
Blum's government fell quickly, but colonial leadership in Vietnam 
remained in transition. During Second World War, the Axis-allied Vichy 
government took over in Indochina, but its hold remained fragile. The 
Japanese presence grew, while anticolonial groups coalesced into the 
umbrella organization known as the Viet Minh in 1941, which opposed 
both the French and Japanese. 
With the defeat of Japan in August of 1945, Viet Minh leader 
Ho Chi Minh seized on the power vacuum to declare an independent 
Vietnam. The labour question quickly emerged to play a central role in 
Ho's initiatives. Announcing the creation of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945, Ho Chi Minh set about organizing 
workers into what he foresaw as "one big union'', the Vietnam Federation 
of Trade Unions (VFTU), modelled on the French Confederation Generale 
du Travail (CGT). After initial Viet Minh successes, the French moved 
to reassert authority, and by late 1946 the first Indochina War was under 
way. As a result, the VFTU made little headway either in the South or 
in Vietnam's cities still controlled by the French.9 Even so, by 1949 the 
VFTU could boast some 258,000 members. 10 
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BUU AND THE BIRTH OF THE CVTC UNDER 
FRENCH COLONIALISM 
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As the French struggled against increasing Viet Minh resistance, Jouan 
began his work in the South with the welcome addition of an energetic 
nationalist named Tran Quoc Buu. From his teens, Buu, who hailed from 
Binh Dinh Province in central Vietnam, devoted himself to the nationalist 
cause. In 1940, French authorities sentenced him to a lengthy term at 
Poulo Condore island prison. Following his release in 1945, Buu fought 
alongside the Viet Minh. After a time, disillusioned by Viet Minh excesses, 
Buu met Jouan, who quickly became his mentor. 11 
In particular, Jouan taught the virtues of corporatist labour relations, 
stressing the utility of chambres mixtes de metiers, or trade councils, 
in which employers, employee representatives, and local and national 
government authorities would meet and jointly make management decisions 
- ideas strongly promoted in Christian trade union circles as alternatives 
to radical socialism. 12 Despite their interest in such tripartite arrangements, 
Buu and Jouan stressed that labour unions must be separate independent 
forces, acting solely in the interests of their membership. Buu believed 
that he had found a "third force" capable of unifying and reconstructing 
Vietnamese society non-violently. This ideology remained at the core of 
his movement until 197 5 - although circumstances, especially a hostile 
state and employers, thwarted any real implementation of such corporate 
labour arrangements. 
Disregarding legal prohibitions, Buu and Jouan launched an aggressive 
campaign to organize workers and recruited approximately 8,000 members 
by the end of 1950. The organization quickly grew to include at least ten 
'illegal' unions, representing the employees of Citroen and the airline Air 
Vietnam, as well as shoemakers, typesetters, tailors, and barbers. 13 
French authorities, while tolerating the burgeoning labour movement, 
at times sought to circumscribe its activities. For instance, colonial officials 
denied Buu's petition to hold a public demonstration on 1 May 1950, 
in honour of May Day. Manifesting a determined militancy, Buu and 
his fellow budding unionists instead organized a "requiem mass" at the 
Cathedral of Saigon. Following services, union leaders directed members 
to the federation's headquarters where they approved a series of resolutions 
to be presented to the government. Demands included new labour codes 
decriminalizing labour unions, the closure of a Cholon gambling house, 
and an end to the subcontracting system at Saigon's port. 14 
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In 1952, under pressure from Viet Minh gains, Bao Dai, the head of 
state installed in 1949 by the French to allow the Vietnamese limited self-
government, finally issued a new series of labour regulations which at last 
permitted workers to organize.15 The decrees generated strong opposition 
from Vietnam's bourgeoisie, both French and Vietnamese. Nonetheless, the 
Bao Dai government and French officials clung fatuously to hopes that the 
reforms might generate support among the working classes for Bao Dai's 
struggling government. 16 
Buu and Jouan, seizing on their newly legal status, officially named 
their organization the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian Workers. 17 
Perhaps to appeal to non-Christian workers, the organization did not use 
the designation of "Christian" in the Vietnamese name (Tong Lien Doan 
Lao Cong Vietnam). From the start, the CVTC focused considerable 
energy on recruiting rural workers, especially plantation workers and 
tenant farmers; the organization's rural unions quickly became and would 
remain the confederation's largest constituency, since the population was 
overwhelmingly involved in rural activities. It was estimated a little over 
a year later that the CVTC's membership had grown to 38,990, including 
around 1,300 unionists in Hanoi. 18 Despite the organization's ties to the 
International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU), Christians 
remained in the minority. Officially, the CVTC "was open to all workers" 
and set out to attract a diverse membership, inclusive of all religious and 
minority groups. 19 
While on the one hand seeking to maintain peace with French and 
Vietnamese authorities, on the other the CVTC strove to maintain an active 
militancy. In 1953, the CVTC initiated strikes by employees of Air France, 
500 shoemakers in Cholon, and workers in the five largest printing houses 
in Saigon. That same year, when government officials in the north moved 
to curb CVTC operations, Buu and Jouan protested loudly, "unleashing a 
violent campaign in the press for trade union freedom". 20 
The awkward dance between labour and colonial state, however, 
would soon be over. French colonialism was on its last legs by 1953, 
and CVTC officials began preparing for its aftermath. The organization 
adamantly opposed the temporary division of Vietnam mandated by the 
Geneva Accords in July 1954. Banners strung across the confederation's 
headquarters denounced the Geneva Accords with slogans such as "To 
Divide Vietnam is to Open the Door of Southeast Asia to Communism".21 
In particular, Buu and Jouan feared for the fate of the CVTC's northern 
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affiliates. CVTC-affiliated workers at the Cai-Da mines in northern 
Vietnam launched a successful work stoppage in early 1954. The strike 
enhanced Buu's reputation and fed hopes for further organization in the 
more industrialized north. 22 Within a year, however, as feared, distressing 
news began to pour in from the north of persecution and union-breaking, 
including reports that the DRV government in the north, apparently viewing 
the CVTC as subservient to Western colonialism, had sentenced trade 
unionists to forced labour on the Chinese border.23 The CVTC was "living 
though a real nightmare", an unnerved Buu wrote to a supporter.24 
As the CVTC struggled, the VFTU became the sole legal union for all 
workers in the north. While serving as a representative agency for workers, 
the VFTU also served the state, mobilizing, training, and disciplining 
workers. It has remained closely associated with the Communist Party to 
this day.25 
COOPERATING WITH 
NGO DINH DIEM 
Seeking to accommodate itself to new circumstances, the CVTC underwent 
important changes. Jouan, perhaps recognizing that a labour organization 
headed by a former colonial official would send the wrong message, 
decided to return home to France and leave the movement in the hands 
of Vietnamese, in particular Buu. CVTC officials also began seeking the 
leverage of new alliances as life grew more dangerous and complicated 
- alliances that would prove enormously problematic. The organization 
made contact with the CIA, establishing a long-lasting, shadowy rela-
tionship. 26 Additionally, despite the organization's avowed commitment to 
independence, the CVTC cautiously embraced the rising ambitions of Ngo 
Dinh Diem and his politically ambitious family, after Diem was appointed 
prime minister by Bao Dai in June 1954. As early as 1954, the French 
CFTC described the Ngos as "already for a long time having exercised a 
useful and discreet influence" on the CVTC.27 Buu joined the Ngo family 
in forming the Can Lao Party (Revolutionary Personalist Labour Party), 
which Diem envisioned as his chief vehicle for promoting both social 
reform and his own control over the country.28 Yet relations between the 
CVTC and Diem always retained a certain tension. On several occasions 
Buu and other labour leaders publicly blasted Diem for the latter's efforts 
to co-opt the confederation.29 
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Still, the CVTC supported Diem during the pivotal Battle of Saigon 
in 1955. With Diem firmly in power, the ranks of labour grew, as 
did organizing campaigns. The Tenant Farmers' Federation expanded 
dramatically under the personal patronage of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's 
brother and chief political advisor.30 By late 1955, the CVTC publicly 
claimed half a million members, although privately it admitted to the 
still-substantial figure of around 350,000.31 The confederation expanded 
membership services, opening several consumer cooperatives and ambi-
tiously planning a "worker city" to provide low-cost housing and services 
for urban workers.32 It moved to set up chambres mixtes de metiers 
arrangements and to open a series of "Raiffeisen Cooperatives", modelled 
on the rural savings and loans associations begun by Friedrich Raiffeisen 
in Germany in the 1860s.33 
The clashing visions of the Ngo family and the CVTC, however, 
could not be suppressed. Diem clearly intended to control the organization, 
while the CVTC remained determined to preserve its autonomy. Buu told 
confidants he was "reluctant to become over-obligated" to the government 
by "accepting outright grants from it or any of the political parties".34 In 
a meeting with the president in February 1956, Buu bluntly told Diem 
that "his idea of democracy was not [Diem's] hand-picked assembly".35 
The CVTC followed up by amplifying its attacks on local officials who 
harassed union members. Such brazen outspokenness stoked the fires of 
Diem's and Nhu's obsessive suspicions. The final straw, according to U.S. 
Embassy observers, came when the CVTC failed to pass a resolution 
pledging support to Diem's government.36 By late autumn 1956, Nhu 
unleashed a hostile campaign against the CVTC, targeting in particular 
the Tenant Farmers' Union. Soon rumours swirled that authorities planned 
to arrest Buu himself. 37 
Over the next several years, relations worsened. Soon Diem had 
virtually rendered the CVTC an organization in name only, and its 
agenda had largely stalled. Increasingly, Buu relied on his CIA ties and 
other American friends to offset the threat of the Ngos. Buu complained 
bitterly to allies in the CIA of recent arrests of CVTC officials designed 
to "intimidate labour", and warned that workers were growing "restive", 
some being attracted to Buddhist calls for a general strike against Diem.38 
In early autumn of 1963, he went public with complaints about the Diem 
presidency, sharply criticizing the Ngos before a United Nations committee 
investigating Vietnam. 39 
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Clearly, Buu had ties to those conspiring against Diem, but if the 
CVTC leadership hoped that labour-state relations would improve following 
the coup resulting in Diem's killing in November 1963, they were sorely 
disappointed. The new Saigon government took Buu into custody, apparently 
concerned over his previous ties to the Diem regime. Only the personal 
intercession of the U.S. embassy allowed for his release.40 
TOWARD THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR 
For several months, the CVTC waited for the tumult sweeping South 
Vietnamese politics to settle. By early 1964, a new government had been 
formed under General Nguyen Khanh. Again the U.S. embassy aided 
organized labour's cause by pushing Khanh to meet directly with Buu, a 
meeting where the two worked out an agreement allowing the CVTC vital 
room to organize.41 By the mid-1960s, key U.S. officials clearly had come 
to view the CVTC as prime evidence of emerging democracy in Vietnam 
- evidence they could use to support intervention, as the White House 
and Congress began pondering the future of South Vietnam. 
Seizing the newly liberalized atmosphere, the CVTC embarked on a 
flurry of new organizational activity. The plantation and tenant farmers' 
unions, decimated by Diem, rebounded as tens of thousands of Vietnamese 
farmers and workers joined CVTC-affiliated unions.42 Seeking to broaden 
international support, Buu's federation dropped the term "Christian" from 
the Western translations of the confederation's title and was known from 
then on as the CVT, although it retained its affiliation with the Christian 
International.43 Buoyed by success, in mid-1964, a CVT cadre ecstatically 
declared at a Singapore labour conference: "The activities of our syndicate 
are not like a thatch fire, burning for a short time and often dying out. 
But on the contrary, her activities persist like a coal fire under a layer 
of ashes".44 
In the summer of 1964, a protracted conflict with the American-born 
Chinese owner ofVimytex textile factory provided Buu with an opportunity 
to stoke some of the ashes. Typical of the Asian textile industry, Vimytex, 
purchased with a US$6 million loan from the U.S. Operations Mission 
(USOM), had a reputation for dismal labour conditions.45 Foreign-owned 
and linked to the Americans, Vimytex offered a tempting target - an 
opportunity for the CVT to play on mounting anxieties about expanding 
outside influence in South Vietnam. The mill owner, however, showed no 
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signs of acceding to workers' demands. Eventually he locked out three-
quarters of his workers, roughly 120 employees, and transferred others to 
a military camp.46 
As the CVT mobilized, General Khanh suddenly threatened the 
campaign. On 19 August 1964, amid growing political chaos, the general 
declared a state of emergency, partly in reaction to the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident, but also to quell mounting protests in the streets of Saigon. 
Assuming total authority, Khanh banned all strikes and mass meetings. 47 
Once again the state was determined to threaten labour advances. 
In response, Buu upped the ante by announcing a general strike to 
involve all labour unions in Saigon. A general strike would demonstrate 
to all of Vietnam the independence and potency of the CVT.48 "We have 
arrived at a point where we must take chances. We are taking this one 
now with the conviction that for the world of labour we represent the 
only solution outside Communism," Buu explained to French journalist 
Jean Lacouture.49 
On 21 September 1964, the CVT shut down Saigon. With the city's 
electrical workers joining the strike, South Vietnam's capital city sat in 
darkness for a full day, without water, electricity, phone services, or bus 
transportation. Sixty thousand CVT members joined in the work stoppage. 
Buu led a parade of several thousand strikers through Saigon to Khanh's 
offices where they presented their demands. With the general conveniently 
out-of-town, his aides negotiated with strike leaders.so Thousands of workers 
waited outside for news of the deliberations. Finally, to great fanfare, Buu 
appeared, announcing a tentative settlement easing labour restrictions.s1 
Impressed by the militancy of Saigon workers, Lacouture wondered if 
the one-day mobilization marked the emergence of a potential third force: 
"For the first time a force arose that could be either a possible replacement 
for the present regime or a link to the enemy regime or the first pillar of 
a regime to come."s2 Buu's organization, however, was badly overextended 
- especially with regard to its relations with Saigon officials. While 
dramatically asserting itself, the CVT created new enemies and infuriated 
old ones. Buddhists as well as Buu's foes within the labour movement 
now viewed the confederation as a surging threat. More seriously, the CVT 
moved to the top of General Khanh's enemy list. Then on 10 October, 
General Khanh included Buu's name on a list of thirteen military officers 
and seven civilians to be arrested on charges of conspiring against Khanh 
in a failed coup on 13 September. s3 
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Fortunately for Buu, on 22 October a military court, no doubt 
responding to pressure from the U.S. embassy, found him innocent of all 
charges; loud cheers reverberated through the courtroom when his acquittal 
was announced.54 Following his exoneration, Buu sidestepped any direct 
condemnation of Saigon officials, doubtless understanding that he still 
depended on the state for survival. He still expressed the hope that the 
verdict signalled a new openness to democratic governance, and that Khanh, 
at last, was "ready to show sincere comprehension and cooperation with a 
free and independent labour organization in the national struggle".55 
While the CVT had made remarkable gains since the fall of Diem, 
it obviously remained subject to a number of pernicious forces. First and 
foremost was the Saigon government, but there were also divisions within 
the trade union movement. While it was the largest and most influential 
labour organization in South Vietnam, it was not the only one. Upstart 
organizations, such as a military-led effort to organize longshoremen on 
Saigon's piers, presented constant annoyances - always presenting a threat 
but never rising to a substantial challenge. 56 A former CVT officer, Bui 
Luong, who had had a severe falling-out with the organization and formed 
a rival group, constantly hurled accusations at Buu, at one point charging 
him with accepting US$200,000 from the North Vietnamese to build a house 
and simultaneously with pocketing US$45,000 from the U.S. embassy. 57 
Meanwhile, in early 1965, the Buddhist Institute for Secular Affairs began 
organizing workers. Quickly, the institute attempted to launch general strikes 
in several cities, including Hue, Quang Tri, and Da Nang.58 
Even greater trials followed in 1965. Khanh fell from power, eventually 
to be replaced by a government headed by Air Marshall Nguyen Cao 
Ky as prime minister. Buu and the CVT concluded that the new prime 
minister considered them an enemy. Ky, they feared, meant to "thwart, if 
not destroy, the CVT".59 The full-scale U.S. military intervention in the 
summer of 1965, fully endorsed by the CVT, also presented challenges 
and opportunities. With ever-growing leverage over the South Vietnamese 
leadership, the Americans, very much aware of the need to make South 
Vietnam appear democratic, pushed Ky to work with organized labour. 
Thrown on the defensive, Ky soon was insisting that his government was 
both "pro-worker and pro-peasant".60 Again, a temporary modus vivendi 
allowed the CVT to continue its work. 
The CVT leadership gained new appreciation for Ky when the prime 
minister moved against Buddhist protesters in Da Nang.61 The Buddhist 
24 Edmund Wehrle 
Institute's drive to organize workers, of course, helped persuade trade 
unionists of the need for Ky's hard line; the CVT hoped to organize all 
workers, and competition from the upstart Buddhists was not appreciated. 
In August 1966, following decisive anti-Buddhist raids in Da Nang and 
Hue, the CVT invited Ky to its headquarters as its honoured guest. There, 
500 unionists greeted the prime minister as a hero, interrupting Ky's speech 
with applause ten times.62 
Buu's improved relationship with the national government allowed the 
CVT yet another opportunity to expand. In particular, the Tenant Farmers' 
Federation, a key CVT affiliate, flourished, expanding to nearly 100,000 
members. At times, the Tenant Farmers competed directly with the Viet 
Cong for the loyalty of farmers and farm labourers. In early 1965, Viet 
Cong guerrillas, relying heavily upon violence and intimidation, drove 
away the French management of South Vietnam's largest rubber plantation 
in Binh Duong Province. The Viet Cong, however, quickly proved unable 
to pay or feed workers. A "delegation of workers therefore made their 
way to Saigon", where the CVT tenant farmers took up their cause, and 
successfully negotiated a new contract with Michelin. 63 
CAUGHT BETWEEN UNION MILITANTS 
AND THE STATE 
Its entente with Ky, however, hardly made up for the myriad challenges 
facing the CVT. As U.S. soldiers swept into the country, so too did painful 
inflation. The meagre wages paid to South Vietnam's workers, especially 
its rural workers, lagged behind rising prices, soaring at an annual rate of 
124 per cent in 1966.64 The CVT also remained at the mercy of the 
police. Buu openly worried that General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, the near-
psychotic head of the national police, would kill him and blame it on the 
Viet Cong. 65 
It was in fact a clash with General Loan that set off the next big 
challenge facing the CVT - an episode that almost shattered organized 
labour in South Vietnam. While the CVT had grown tremendously since 
1963, especially organizing campaigns on behalf of Vietnamese employed 
by Americans, the confederation worked to avoid direct confrontations 
with government-owned operations and Republic of Vietnam officials, 
especially the Saigon police. CVT leaders fully understood the mercurial 
nature of their government, but the organization's reluctance to take on 
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the state irked many younger members eager to press democratization and 
workers' rights. 
The first sparks of labour-state conflict flared in the summer of 1967 
when the French-owned Compagnie des Eaux et d'Electricite (CEE) agreed 
to transfer operation and control of a large power plant serving Saigon to 
the South Vietnamese government.66 Plant employees anticipated job losses, 
and the CVT-affiliated Water and Electricity Workers Union demanded a 
fair severance package for those who became unemployed. For employees 
who would remain, the union demanded a 12 per cent pay hike. When 
concessions failed to materialize, workers threatened to strike. Vo Van Tai, 
leader of the CVT's militant "young Turks" and chief of Saigon's labour 
council, aggressively pushed the electrical workers to take a strong stand. 
Buu obviously preferred moderation but feared stifling the ambitions of 
militants in his ranks. 67 
Both the CVT and state officials briefly put the mounting conflict 
aside as national elections won by General Nguyen Van Thieu consumed 
the country, but almost immediately thereafter the smouldering conflict 
returned. Seeing no signs of concessions from the government, Tai and 
CVT radicals scheduled a strike for early in the new year. On 30 December 
1967, General Loan issued a communique declaring that the National 
Police would "no longer refrain from intervention in the growing number 
of strikes".68 Ignoring the general, on 11 January 1968 1,000 power plant 
employees walked off the job.69 
A few hours after declaring the strike, the CVT Saigon Labour Council 
arrived at the Labour Ministry's offices to open negotiations. Suddenly 
Loan's men burst into the room, and arrested six labour leaders, including 
Vo Van Tai.70 Word of the arrests spread rapidly, and sympathy strikes 
broke out across Saigon. Bus drivers quit their routes, and longshoremen 
abandoned the ports. 71 However, these protests only spurred Loan to take 
harsher action. He loaded five garbage trucks with police, directed the 
convoy to CVT headquarters, and personally delivered "requisitions", 
ordering workers back to their jobs immediately. Police ripped down 
strike banners and arrested any who dared resist. Loan's violent reputation 
persuaded enough workers to return to their jobs to allow the electrical 
plant to reopen at full capacity. In the wake of Loan's crackdown, sympathy 
strikes petered out, but bitterness remained. 72 
Never enthusiastic about the strikes, Buu privately blamed CVT 
militants and moved to negotiate a settlement with the government before 
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the upcoming Tet holidays. On 16 January he ordered remaining strikers 
back to work. In return, the Saigon government agreed to a 12 per cent 
pay increase, and General Loan released the labour leaders still in his 
custody, including Vo Van Tai. 73 
An uneasy stillness settled across the Saigon labour scene, but the 
Viet Cong, who had been applauding the strikes through radio propaganda, 
warned that "( o Jn the eve of Tet, the stormy fire of revolutionary struggle 
of our workers and labourers will kindle fiercely right in the cities".74 Only 
days later, the Viet Cong launched its Tet Offensive. As the conflagration 
spread, swelling violence destroyed the homes of more than 1,000 trade 
unionists. 
Militant CVT members argued that, in light of the government's recent 
suppression, the confederation should assume a stony silence, sending 
authorities a pointed message. Again the organization faced a tough decision, 
weighing activism against good relations with its government. Buu and the 
CVT leadership decided to focus on the immediate terrorist threat from the 
Viet Cong and support their government. The organization issued a sharp 
condemnation of the "criminal action of the enemy".75 
If the CVT hoped to be rewarded for its loyalty, it was sorely 
disappointed. As the dust settled in Saigon, General Loan rearrested a 
key trade union leader. The police action mystified Buu, who could only 
speculate that Loan "must be insane".76 Another round of interventions 
by Buu and his American allies finally effected the release of the jailed 
CVT official. 
Despite the extreme setbacks of the first half of 1968, the roller 
coaster pattern that defined the CVT's existence persisted. Following 
the Tet Offensive, the CVT managed to expand its influence, defying all 
expectations. Surprisingly, the CVT also found its relations with Saigon 
authorities improving, especially with the retirement of General Loan, who 
had suffered a severe injury in a Viet Cong rocket attack. 77 Likewise, as 
the Viet Cong retreated following what was certainly a military defeat, 
confederation organizers expanded their rural activities. "The sky was 
bright again after several months of tempest", a CVT official explained.78 
The South Vietnamese economy entered into a brief period of economic 
expansion, especially in the countryside. 79 
The CVT also continued aggressively to organize Vietnamese employed 
by the U.S. military and associated contractors - a workforce that at its 
peak included several hundred thousand workers, who were among the best 
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paid in South Vietnam. The American military, with its focus on nation-
building and winning "hearts and minds", sought to avoid confrontation 
with its Vietnamese employees at all costs. Likewise, informed by a New 
Deal worldview, official U.S. policy encouraged unionization. To this end, 
the military established a single agency, the Office of Civilian Personnel 
(OCP), to oversee labour relations with all employees. From the start, the 
OCP faced a restless, often militant workforce. While American employees 
signed a no-strike pledge, Vietnamese workers showed little reluctance to 
walk off jobs. Hundreds of wildcat and CVT-sanctioned strikes plagued the 
U.S. military and associated contractors throughout the war. Most related 
to wage issues, as inflation swept across the South Vietnamese economy, 
but issues of safety, treatment of employees, and the hiring of so-called 
third country nationals (usually Koreans or Taiwanese) also caused worker 
protest. Seeking to avoid full-scale labour conflict, the OCP tolerated brief 
strikes and worked hard, increasingly in alliance with the CVT, to appease 
its workforce. 80 
"AWAKENING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE MASSES": 
TOWARD POLITICS 
Even as CVT members relied upon the Americans for jobs in a labour-
friendly environment, many in both the rank-and-file and leadership 
recognized that South Vietnam's heavy dependence on outsiders was 
a double-edged sword that delegitimized their country as much as it 
represented a necessary lifeline. They looked forward to the promise of 
Vietnamization. An American departure, Buu optimistically forecasted, 
would inspire an "awakening of the conscience of the masses".81 
Recognizing that its chief vulnerability was its often-tense relation-
ship with Republic of Vietnam government officials, the CVT, which long 
eschewed direct involvement in politics, began testing the political waters. 
In 1968, breaking with precedent, it joined in forming a coalition called 
Lien Minh Dan Toe Cach Mang Xa Hoi (National Alliance for Social 
Revolution), composed of several political and ethnic parties, including 
Catholics, the Hoa Hao religious sect, the CVT, and Senator Tran Van Don 
(a perennial political player and one of the plotters of the 1963 coup against 
Diem).82 From behind the scenes, President Nguyen Van Thieu encouraged 
the development, arguing that the alliance would bring political stability 
and, presumably, political security for himself. 83 The alliance, however, fell 
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apart quickly, largely due to diverging ambitions of all parties and Thieu's 
meddling efforts to control the political organization. 84 
Undaunted, the CVT leadership moved to organize the Cong-Nong Party 
(the Worker-Farmer Party), a political party to represent the confederation's 
interests. Established in November 1969, Cong-Nong was purported to be an 
entity independent from the CVT, yet its connection to the labour movement 
was obvious - essentially an open secret.85 Borrowing the CVT's pluralistic 
aims of uniting farmers, labourers, urban workers, minority groups, and 
various religious sects, Buu proposed to include a diverse conglomeration 
of largely underrepresented groups, possibly including his old allies in the 
religious organization Cao Dai, in his new political party. 86 
The CVT's political venture did enjoy considerable success. Using 
CVT unions and social centres as a base, the Cong-Nong Party, which 
aimed to train a cadre corps of some 3,000 organizers, quickly spread to 
forty provinces and many cities. Voters elected Cong-Nong Party candidates 
to seats in the General Assembly and local offices. 87 From positions of 
influence, Cong-Nong pressed such measures as civilian military training 
(with the aim of mobilizing South Vietnamese against Communists) and 
the 1971 Land-to-the-Tiller Act, which proposed to transfer three million 
acres of prime farmland in the Mekong Delta and central lowlands from 
landlords to tenant families. 88 The CVT seemed on the verge of becoming 
a major political force with its populist, reformist agenda. 
By the end of 1971, however, progress seemed to stall. Inflation became 
an ever-greater problem, and unemployment rose as refugees filled South 
Vietnam's cities. The U.S. drawdown of troops and investment in Southeast 
Asia worsened the situation, as thousands of Vietnamese employed by 
Americans lost their jobs. 
Meanwhile, the CVT faced increasing opposition from its trade union 
rivals. Vo Van Tai, the militant who had been imprisoned by General Loan 
during the labour tumult of early 1968, left the CVT shortly thereafter and 
established the rival National Confederation of Labour (LCL) to challenge 
what he saw as lethargy in the CVT. Obviously committed to aggressive 
action (which Buu and other CVT leaders increasingly saw as needlessly 
dangerous), in the summer of 1971, along with the Federation of Railroad 
Workers, Tai attempted to launch a general strike to protest against rising 
income taxes. While the two-day strike had little impact short of closing 
some banks, Tai's militancy reminded some of the CVT's shortcomings.89 
Within the CVT, younger, more militant members complained of the 
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organization's stagnation and charged Buu and the confederation leadership 
with corruption - accusations not without some merit. Indeed, while 
the CVT became increasingly involved in politics, contributing to some 
impressive developments, a tendency to seek compromise and shy away 
from militant trade union action increasingly plagued the organization. No 
doubt, part of this reticence stemmed from anxiety about confronting the 
Saigon government, both out of fear of a backlash and concerns that such 
a challenge would only aid the Communist enemy. 
The dilemmas of coexistence with the Saigon government in fact 
grew more taxing as the war dragged on. In the wake of the 1972 Easter 
Offensive, during which the North Vietnamese made impressive gains before 
being repelled by American airpower, President Thieu declared martial law 
and banned all strikes. Since its founding, the CVT regarded the right to 
strike as an indispensable component of democracy. Nevertheless, Buu, 
who had resolutely resisted such incursions in the past, chose to acquiesce 
and support the ban. His action appeared to many a sad capitulation to 
a corrupt, authoritarian government. Buu insisted the CVT was now on 
the inside and needed to make sacrifices to maintain stability. "Now the 
situation - the danger - is different", he explained.90 With the imminent 
departure of American troops, Buu now felt it necessary to stand with the 
Saigon government, even as the CVT's Cong-Nong Party continued to 
press for reforms. 
With the announcement of the Paris Accords in January 1973, ending 
the United States' direct participation in the war, Thieu seemed even 
more determined to rein in labour - and all potential political opponents. 
Without American leverage, Thieu felt no obligation to continue fostering 
democracy. Reminiscent of Diem's Can Lao, Thieu announced the formation 
of the "Democracy (Dan Chu) Party" and made it clear that it would be 
the dominant force in South Vietnamese politics. Buu's refusal to join the 
"Democracy Party" prompted a spiteful Thieu to launch a labour wing of 
Dan Chu to compete directly with Cong Nong. 91 CVT officials recognized 
the threat, viewing the Democracy Party's labour wing as a first step toward 
creating a national labour union under Thieu's direct control.92 Under the 
surface, resentment smouldered, but Buu and other CVT leaders (to the 
lasting bitterness of more militant members) resisted direct confrontation 
with Thieu. Again, labour bent. 
Paradoxically, as South Vietnam crumbled, the CVT's political 
clout seemed to grow. Buu became an important ambassador/lobbyist to 
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Washington, able to gain meetings with antiwar Democrats. By the fall 
of 1974, he was using his leverage to criticize the government openly, 
charging that it was "inefficient and corrupt". Both Thieu and the North 
Vietnamese, Buu insisted, needed to dedicate themselves honestly to 
implementing the Paris Accords.93 
In Saigon's final hours, Buu travelled to Washington in March 1975 
for one last desperate round of lobbying, meeting with President Gerald 
Ford and Senator Edward Kennedy. "Give us sufficient aid to survive. Do 
not let us die slowly, agonizingly," he pleaded.94 
Buu was wrong, of course; the death of South Vietnam would come 
quickly - in fact, within a few short weeks. Buu managed to find a space 
on the infamous American airlift, while key CVT leaders and their families 
escaped out into the South China Sea on a barge. Floating toward safety, 
the CVT refugees listened in grim silence as radio announcers read lists 
of those wanted by victorious North Vietnam authorities; some heard their 
own names crackle over the airwaves. In the vanquished city, an observer 
noted constant activity at CVT headquarters as the new government moved 
in, eager to use the compound for its own purposes. In the midst of the 
bustle, for several days no one thought to remove a portrait of Buu from 
the wall.95 
CONCLUSION: 
LINKING THE PAST TO THE PRESENT 
From its inception, the CVT walked a fine - and dangerous - line. While 
extolling independence of action and autonomy from the state and all other 
forces, it was compelled by circumstances to engage in compromising 
alliances, especially with a succession of problematic Saigon governments. 
In the late 1940s, French authorities had allowed the formation of what 
became the CVT, in the hope that the organization might attract mass 
support for the struggling colonial regime. Meanwhile, confederation leaders 
sought to forge a militant and anticommunist labour movement without 
falling afoul of the colonial government. After the French departure and the 
division of Vietnam, the same treacherous pattern persisted. Buu and the 
CVT leadership sought to work with the repressive Diem government, while 
maintaining some level of independence. As a result, the organization was 
tainted by association with the Ngos, and suffered at the same time from 
government repression. Later, the CVT strove to work with the Americans 
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and with the Thieu regime, going so far as to acquiesce in Thieu's ban on 
strikes in 1972. Such compromises allowed the confederation to navigate 
the dangerous shoals of South Vietnamese politics, yet tarnished the 
organization in the eyes of many. What was left was a public perception 
of dependence on outsiders - hardly the goal of an organization aiming 
to establish itself as an independent voice for Vietnam's workers. 
This labour history, however, certainly makes Vietnam fertile soil for 
labour activism and agitation, to hibernate and re-emerge when the time 
comes. During its brief existence, South Vietnam saw a remarkable number 
of strikes, as hundreds of thousands threw in their lot with trade unions 
and activism. The tradition of anticolonialism and militancy seems to have 
lived on, to organize and challenge social and workplace injustices, though 
two-and-a-half decades separate the experience of the CVT and present-
day labour upheavals in Vietnam. While the vast majority of strikes have 
occurred in the southern region, especially around Ho Chi Minh City, 
participants are very unlikely to have memories of the CVT. Older workers 
and union officials might have been activists in those tumultuous war years. 
For instance, VGCL President Dang Ngoc Tung was a construction worker 
in Saigon in the 1970s.96 Between 1975 and 2008 came the experiences of 
war, collectivization, Doi Moi, globalization, and a population 60 per cent 
of which is under the age of 30, yet parallels between the earlier movement 
and current developments are evident. To paraphrase American humourist 
Mark Twain, while history does not repeat itself, it frequently rhymes. 
As in the early 1970s, inflation combined with soaring energy costs 
have resulted in serious economic hardship and large-scale strikes. A 
massive migration of rural peasants into cities took place during the second 
Indochina War; similar migrations clearly contribute to challenges faced 
by workers today. Employee complaints about corruption and being given 
no time off for the Tet holidays are as familiar today as in the pre-1975 
period.97 Fiscal deficits and balance-of-payment concerns also plagued pre-
1975 South Vietnam, much as similar factors worry Hanoi today. However, 
two intriguing commonalities standout: awkward labour-state relations, and 
workers targeting foreign-owned enterprises. 
That strikes and workplace protest would focus on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) firms is no surprise. That is where the jobs are; since 
the early 1990s, FDI has dramatically outpaced the growth of state-owned 
enterprises (SO Es). As will be seen in several subsequent chapters, these 
foreign, mostly Asian investors are also notoriously exploitative. Hence, 
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the vast majority of strikes in Vietnam are directed at such foreign-
owned firms. Additionally, there is, as Irene Norlund has suggested, a 
certain "political correctness" about strikes in a socialist country aimed 
at intensively capitalistic firms. 98 Targeting foreigners, in a country with a 
history of exploitation at the hands of outsiders, may both play into this 
political correctness and reflect a continuing perception that SOEs are 
more responsive to workers' needs. Concurrently, government officials 
walk a fine line - seeking to continue attract foreign investment, while 
pacifying worker discontent. 99 In a similar fashion, workers and trade 
unions in the 1960s and 1970s targeted foreign employers and operations, 
especially American-owned firms and the U.S. military. Workers responded 
enthusiastically, launching several thousand strikes in a few years. 
Conversely, in the past the CVT and organized workers generally 
avoided direct challenges or confrontations with the government. Trade 
union leaders fully understood the dangers inherent in challenging the 
state. The events of 1968, when several labour leaders found themselves 
gaoled, certainly reinforced the wisdom of focusing on outsiders rather 
than challenging one's own government. A working relationship with 
the state - particularly with the Labour Ministry and other government 
offices - was imperative. Beyond this, the CVT's philosophy from its 
earliest days stressed corporatist labour relations and systematic cooperation 
between unions, the state, and employers. The CVT strove to establish 
such a working relationship with a host of Saigon governments; the results, 
however, were decidedly mixed. 
Today's Vietnamese General Confederation of Labour (VGCL) is 
obviously much more closely associated with the state and Communist 
Party. 100 Without question, the Vietnamese state has a great deal invested 
in a globalized economy; strikes and labour agitation already have made 
foreign firms wary of Vietnam. The VGCL finds itself uncomfortably 
between its government and an increasingly angry workforce. 101 The Party 
and police today have more capacity to infiltrate and neutralize illegal 
unions than was the case under Ngo Dinh Diem or Nguyen Van Thieu in 
South Vietnam. 
Despite the legitimate discontent of some of its members, the VGCL, 
like the CVT before it, has not been ineffectual in pursuing workers' 
interests. 102 VGCL officials have not been silent as pressure builds. In autumn 
2008 at a Hanoi conference on labour protection, confederation leaders 
blamed the recent wave of strikes on employers who flout labour laws 
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and disregard commitments made to workers. Officials also acknowledged 
"some shortcomings in the State's management of the issue". 103 At the 
Hanoi conference, Truong Lam Danh, deputy chairman of the HCMC City 
Federation of Labour, bemoaned strikes prompted by employers' "broken 
promises". 104 Still, as with the case of the CVT a generation earlier, workers 
have ample reason to doubt the state-controlled VGCL's absolute dedication 
to their interests. Workers frequently call wildcat strikes, circumventing 
the confederation. 
Tran Quoc Buu and other leaders of the pre-1975 South Vietnamese 
labour movement insisted that trade unions must be independent of the 
state (even as they habitually compromised their autonomy). Today, in 
some circles, critics of the VGCL have made tentative steps toward forming 
independent trade unions. 105 Such initiatives, however, have met with swift 
reprisals from the state. In 2006, authorities sentenced eight activists involved 
in organizing independent trade unions to prison terms. 106 
Given the long history of the socialist state in Vietnam and its 
persistence despite globalization, however, the VGCL is unlikely to be 
challenged by independent trade unions. While the state has an obvious 
stake in expanding and facilitating FDI, it remains rhetorically committed 
to creating a "civilised and equitable society". 107 Workers and the VGCL 
have played off that premise and, linking up with the lingering distrust 
of foreigners and capitalism, have made such gains as the recent increase 
of the minimum wage. 
The militancy of today's Vietnamese workers would hardly surprise 
the leaders of the CVT, who witnessed the dramatic proliferation of 
strikes and worker action during the 1960s and 1970s. They would also 
certainly recognize and perhaps even sympathize with the VGCL as it 
struggles with limited success to give voice to worker discontent. A host 
of debilitating dilemmas burdened the confederation. Yet, in the words of 
Melanie Beresford, the "voice of the poor" may still "offset the growing 
influence of public-private business networks."108 
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3 
STATE ENTERPRISE WORKERS 
"Masters" or "Commodities"? 
Michael Karadjis 
The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) claims to be still running a socialist-
oriented political system, and continues to cite the state economy as a key 
sector in the country's development. There has been an ongoing debate 
between the more socialist-oriented wing of the party, which advocates 
retaining significant state ownership throughout the economy, and the more 
market-oriented wing, which wants majority state ownership only in areas 
such finance and infrastructure while leaving the rest to the private sector. 
By examining one aspect of the state sector that can be considered an 
essential element of the CPV's "socialist orientation" - worker participation 
in management - this chapters seeks to interpret this debate. 
In line with Leninist ideology, the CPV officially claims that workers 
must become "masters in social production". 1 However, as in other 
communist regimes that have diverged from their democratic ideals, making 
Vietnamese workers complete "masters" seems to be an impossible goal. 
In the pre-reform era, one may be led to assume that, like the Soviet and 
Chinese models it outwardly resembles, the Vietnamese state was totalitarian 
and thus had complete control over society, state enterprises, and workers 
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